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RECENT DECISIONS
new citizenship, Congress, in 1868, 3 recog-
nized voluntary expatriation as an "inherent
right" of all individuals. In 1907, Congress
provided that the performance of certain
acts4 would constitute a renunciation of citi-
zenship and effect a voluntary expatriation.
The passage of this statute transformed the
right of voluntary expatriation into a totally
different concept. Expatriation, which had
been the act of the citizen, was now to be-
come that of the State.
In Mackenzie v. Hare,5 a native-born
American woman married a citizen of
Great Britain who resided here. When she
sought registration as a voter, her applica-
tion was refused on the ground that she had
lost her citizenship by marrying a foreigner.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of
her petition for mandamus. The Court re-
fused to state unequivocally that citizenship
could be involuntarily lost, and hence it
emphasized that this was a "condition
voluntarily entered into with notice of the
consequences." 6 However, the idea of vol-
untary expatriation employed in this opinion
was clearly distinguishable from that con-
tained in the Act of 1868. It was no longer
necessary to have a voluntary renunciation
of citizenship. When the individual willfully
performed the act designated by the statute,
he automatically effected his expatriation.
Subsequently, the rationale of this case
was adopted in Savorgnan v. United States!
There the Court, applying a section of the
3REV. STAT. § 1999 (1875).
4 34 Stat. 1228 (1907). The acts included foreign
naturalization, taking an oath to a foreign country
and marriage by an American woman to an alien.
5 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
r Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 312 (1915).
338 U.S. 491 (1950).
Nationality Act of 1940,8 held that ex-
patriation could result even though the
individual did not have a specific intent to
renounce his citizenship. 9 Thus, a citizen
would be held to have "voluntarily" re-
linquished his citizenship when he freely
performed the act designated by the stat-
ute.10
While the prior decisions had tenuously
clung to the idea that the American na-
tional was voluntarily surrendering his
citizenship,1" in Perez v. Brownell12 the
Court decided that a citizen could be ex-
patriated for voting in a foreign election
even though he did not intend that result.
The majority reasoned that the primary
s Section 2 of the Act of 1907, re-enacted in the
Nationality Act of 1940, provided that an Ameri-
can citizen may be expatriated by "taking an oath
of allegiance to a foreign state." 54 Stat. 1169
(1940), 8 U.S.C. § 801(b) (1946). Under the
Nationality Act, the following acts would result in
expatriation for an American citizen: foreign mili-
tary service, foreign employment under certain
conditions, voting in a foreign election, formal
renunciation of citizenship, treason, desertion in
wartime, remaining outside of the United States
to avoid military service, attempt by force to over-
throw or bearing arms against the United States,
continuous residence abroad by a naturalized
American citizen. Subsequently, most of the pro-
visions of this act were adopted in the Immigra-
tion and Nationalization Act of 1952, 66 Stat.
267, 269-72 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481-89 (1958).
9 Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 502
(1950). The courts have been inconsistent in the
application of the doctrine that subjective intent
to renounce citizenship is not a requirement for
expatriation. Compare Kawakita v. United States,
343 U.S. 717 (1952), with United States v. Esperdy,
203 F. Supp. 380 (1962).
10 For a discussion of the subject of duress in
expatriation law, see Note, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 932
(1954).
11 See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334
(1939), where the Court defined expatriation as
"the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of
nationality and allegiance."
12 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
limitation on the congressional power to
regulate in the area of foreign affairs was
the requirement that it act reasonably.
When a rational nexus existed between ex-
patriation and the object of a congressional
power, the government could deprive a
man of his citizenship. 3 Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, in dissenting, maintained that Con-
gress had no constitutional power to divest
an individual of his citizenship. The con-
gressional role in this area was limited to
providing rules for determing when an indi-
vidual had expatriated himself. Voting in a
foreign election was not such an unequiv-
ocal act that it clearly indicated a "volun-
tary abandonment of American citizen-
ship." '4
In Trop v. Dulles,'5 decided the same
day, the Court determined that the statute 1 6
imposing expatriation for wartime desertion
was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Warren
repeated his contention that Congress could
not expatriate an individual against his will.
He added a second argument that the use of
expatriation as a penalty for a crime vio-
lated the eighth amendment which prohibits
cruel and unusual punishment. 7 Mr. Justice
Brennan distinguished this case from the
Perez decision, explaining what, at first
glance, would seem to be a reversal of posi-
tion on the constitutionality of expatriation.
In the Trop case, he found no reasonable
relation between expatriation and an as-
serted congressional power. Therefore, since
the deprivation of citizenship was a severe
penalty, the alternative penal remedies,
rather than expatriation, should be em-
13 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958).
'4 Id. at 78 (dissenting opinion of Warren, C. J.).
15 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
1654 Stat. 1168, 1169 (1940), as amended, 58
Stat. 4 (1944).
17 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-104 (1958).
9 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1963
ployed.' s
In the present case, there is an automatic
loss of citizenship when the "statutory set
of facts develop."'l9 There are no provisions
for judicial safeguards. Thus, when Mr.
Justice Goldberg concluded that the legis-
lative history of the act revealed a penal
purpose, it followed that the statute was
unconstitutional since the procedural re-
quirements of a criminal prosecution were
absent. Justice Goldberg expressed no
opinion on the question of whether the use
of expatriation as a punishment was uncon-
stitutional per se. 20 Justice Brennan, in a
concurring opinion, expands upon the view
he had previously expressed in the Trop
case. Recognizing that any reasonable rela-
tion to a congressional power is lacking in
this case, he concluded that the statute was
penal. There is a strong denial of any con-
stitutional right of Congress to employ ex-
patriation merely as a penal sanction where
inappropriate to the congressional power.
Deprivation of citizenship will be allowed
only "where some affirmative and unique
relationships to policy are apparent."' 21 The
four dissenting justices maintained that the
purpose of the statute was not penal but
regulatory in that it was designed to promote
the morale of the troops. They further con-
cluded that there was a reasonable relation
between the statutory imposition of expatri-
ation and the congressional war power.
The statute in this case would appear to
be punitive rather than regulatory. It is only
by consoling the armed forces with the
18 Id. at 105-14 (concurring opinion of Brennan,
J.).
19 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
167 (1963).
20 d. at 186 n.43.
2. Id. at 188 (concurring opinion of Brennan, J.).
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knowledge that draft evaders will be pun-
ished with loss of citizenship that the as-
serted policy objective can be achieved, and
this is clearly a deterrent and retributive
approach. A statute designed to deter is
penal in nature. 22
In addition, there does not exist a reason-
able necessity for any employment of ex-
patriation in the present situation. In the
Perez case, expatriation was perhaps the
only effective means of regulating the par-
ticipation of our nationals in the elections
of other countries. Under the facts in the
present case, had the individual voluntarily
remained abroad, the imposition of ex-
patriation would fail to achieve the retribu-
tion it was designed to effect. On the other
hand, if the individual returns to this coun-
try, the available penal sanction 23 would
afford an adequate remedy and the addi-
tional infliction of expatriation would ap-
pear to make the punishment disproportion-
ate to the crime.
Indeed, to the extent that the severity of
the punishment is an indication of the puni-
tive purpose of the statute, 24 the act in
question appears to be penal. Deprivation
of citizenship has been characterized by the
Court as an "extraordinarily severe
penalty" 25 and "more serious than the tak-
ing of one's property or the imposition of a
fine or other penalty." 26 While it is true that
22 Klubock, Expatriation-Its Origin and Meaning,
38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 21 (1962).
23 62 Stat. 622 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a)
(1958).
The maximum punishment for draft evaders under
this statute is five years imprisonment and $10,000
fine.
24 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316
(1946).
25 Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612
(1949).
26 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118,
122 (1942).
expatriation may to a dual national cause
but a slight inconvenience, it can have a
severe effect when the individual has but
one nationality and the loss of citizenship
would create statelessness. 2' The stateless
individual may lose the right to have re-
course to any courts if he is mistreated by a
state. 2 Indeed, he may lose all rights under
contemporary international law.
Thus, there is a frank recognition by the
majority in the instant case of the position,
taken with somewhat less clarity in Trop v.
Dulles,29 that when a statutory purpose is
clearly punitive, it will be classified as such
rather than as a regulatory measure or as a
"voluntary" act of expatriation. The import
of this decision casts some doubt on the
constitutionality of the Expatriation Act of
1954. 30 This act provides for a loss of
citizenship when a person is convicted of
certain crimes, including rebellion, insurrec-
tion, seditious conspiracy and advocating
the overthrow of the government in the
manner proscribed by the Smith Act. Not-
withstanding its classification as voluntary
expatriation, the basic purpose of this stat-
ute is the imposition of loss of citizenship
as an added punishment for a crime.3 1
However, since the procedural safeguards
incident to a criminal prosecution are pro-
27 Shaughnessy v. Meyers, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
In this case, an alien who had resided in this coun-
try from 1923 to 1948 was barred from re-enter-
ing after a visit to Hungary and no country would
grant him citizenship. He was detained on Ellis
Island as a "security risk" and the Supreme Court
denied relief. After four years of "imprisonment,"
an executive remedy was finally granted.
28 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 291 (8th
ed. 1955).
29 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
3068 Stat. 1146 (1954), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(9)
(1958).
31 Comment, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64
YALE L.J. 1164, 1181 (1955).
 
